drained her of man-power as much as they could. The Germans in
Western Poland had carried out a similar work over the same period.
They had detained over 400,000 prisoners-of-war, while about one and a
half million men had been transported to forced labour in Germany.
It is not difficult to conclude, therefore, that there was, indeed, no suitable
force organised at that time in Poland with which to conduct a revolution
on any grand scale. The Polish Government could not give orders for
any uprising in their country on the scale so desired by Moscow. Since
the Kremlin refused to admit the logic of the Poles' point of view, a cause
for argument was thereupon established. The Polish Government was
energetic in emphasising that the Underground Army could not reveal its
identity at that stage, and, furthermore, that it could not be directed by any
appeals or orders from Russian radio stations broadcasting in the Polish
It seems there was disappointment in Moscow over the failure to gain
control of the Polish Underground, particularly of its Intelligence Service.
It was quite obvious that this service would have had to supply Poland's
former enemy and present Ally with material. Complete subordination
to Moscow under those circumstances was too much to expect of its
members. Moreover, such a step was to all intents and purposes im-
possible. This Service, based on the best elements within Poland, was
undertaken by those who, in risking their lives, were free to nominate (in
the firm belief that it was for the benefit of their country), the people to
whom they would give the fruits of their labour. Therefore, Moscow
could receive information from Poland regarding Germany, only by the
way of London and only information. There could be no question of the
Polish Underground Army executing the orders of, or being directed by,
the Kremlin. The real intentions of Moscow, however, were soon to be
revealed. Dissatisfied with the existing state of affairs, the Soviets began
to organise a rival Underground organisation of Communist origin in
Poland, who would be prepared to work for them, and not only in purely
military spheres either.
By October and November, 1941, the Kremlin still did not seem to have
any clear notion as to how they were going to deal with this Polish question.
The Soviets had toyed with the idea that, by expressing their goodwill,
not so much in actual deeds as by veiled promises, they might be able to
pull Poland into the Soviet camp by the hand which Sikorski had stretched
out to them in friendliness. To pull her body and soul, and in this
simple manner, achieve their long cherished desire of absorbing Poland.
If Stalin was pinning his hopes on Sikorski, then he should have known
that the Premier of a democratic nation could not change the natural
process of public opinion by the issue of any order, that he was not free to,
and indeed, had no intention of harnessing the Polish Nation to the Soviet
chariot. Only a sincere policy and a responsible guarantee by the Soviets
could bring about this so desired change,